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This paper examines unemployment duration and the incidence of claims following a 36 percent increase
in the maximum weekly benefit in New York State.  This benefit increase sharply increased benefits
for a large group of claimants, while leaving them unchanged for a large share of claimants who provide
a natural comparison group.  The New York benefit increase has the special features that it was unexpected
and applied to in-progress spells.  These features allow the effects on duration to be convincingly separated
from effects on incidence.  The results show a sharp fall in the hazard of leaving UI that coincides
with the increase in benefits.  The evidence is also consistent with a substantial effect of the benefit
level on the incidence of claims and with this change in incidence biasing duration estimates.  The
evidence further suggests that, at least in this case, standard methods that identify duration effects
through nonlinearities in the benefit schedule are not badly biased.
Bruce D. Meyer
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      Baily (1977), Gruber (1997), and Chetty (forthcoming) pursue this approach.  
2
      Detailed surveys can be found in Meyer (2002), Holmlund (1998), Atkinson and
3
Micklewright (1991), Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick (1981), Gustman (1983), Hamermesh
(1977), and Welch (1977).
      See Moffitt (1985), Meyer (1990), and Gritz and MaCurdy (1989) for example.
4
1.  Introduction
Breaking a longstanding deadlock, legislative leaders and Gov. Mario M. Cuomo
agreed today to increase New York State's maximum unemployment benefit by 36
percent, the first raise in five years.  Under the plan, which was quickly approved
by both houses of the Legislature, the maximum weekly benefit of $180 will
immediately rise to $245.
New York Times, April 12, 1989, p. B1.
 The effect of unemployment insurance (UI) on unemployment is of interest for two main
reasons.  First, many authors have argued that UI is a major determinant of differences in
unemployment across countries and over time.   Second, the magnitude of the effect of UI on
1
unemployment is a key input into optimal UI benefit calculations.    A large literature has
2
examined the effects of UI on unemployment.   However, the validity of the sources of
3
identification used in much of the literature has not been carefully examined.  Most work on UI
identifies its effects through cross-state variation in benefits or by assuming a linear relationship
between earnings and duration.  Thus, the work requires the comparability of different states or
requires strong functional form assumptions.  Sometimes changes over time within a state are
used as an additional source of variation.   This paper continues an approach to identification that
4
examines data from before and after sharp changes in the generosity of UI payments.  This quasi-
experiment or natural experiment approach follows the methods begun by Classen (1981), Solon      Subsequent papers using a  “natural experiment” or “quasi-experimental” method include
5
Hunt (1995), Card and Levine (2000), Carling, Holmlund and Vejsiu (2001), and Roed and
Zhang (2003, 2005).  
      The New York Times reported that: “The New York increase, however, was held up because
6
negotiators in the Legislature had until recently insisted on tying that issue to discussion of
increases in workers compensation benefits.  It was only after the two were severed that the way
to a vote was cleared.”
2
(1985) and Meyer (1989).   This paper examines the effects of a 36 percent increase in the
5
maximum UI benefit in New York State on the incidence and duration of UI claims.  
Several aspects of the New York reform make it particularly suitable for examination. 
First, the benefit increase was unexpected.  A benefit increase had been prevented in the past
because of a procedural deadlock in the Legislature.   After the announcement of an agreement
6
between the legislative leaders and the governor, the reform was passed in a few hours and took
effect six days later.  Second, because the procedural deadlock had previously prevented a benefit
increase, the increase is unlikely to have been caused by economic conditions in the state.  Third,
unlike most UI benefit increases, the higher benefits were available to those who had started their
claims before the increase became effective.  Thus, we can examine the effect of the higher
benefits on the durations of a pool of claimants whose decision to file could not have been
influenced by the higher benefits.  Finally, unemployment was fairly stable in New York State
during this time period and the state is large enough that we can disaggregate results by industry
and sub-state region.
The difficulty of identifying UI effects occurs in its most extreme form within a single
state at a point in time.  The weekly UI benefit is a constant fraction of previous earnings except
when an individual receives the minimum or maximum weekly benefit.  Since previous earnings
strongly influence the payoff from returning to work, the economic benefits of returning to work
and the economic gains from receiving benefits are each largely influenced by a common
variable, previous earnings.  Regressions of spell length on weekly benefits and previous      This identification problem created by the dependence of program generosity on an
7
individual's previous earnings is common to many social insurance programs and is emphasized
in Krueger and Meyer (2002).  See Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin (1995) for a similar paper on
workers' compensation. 
3
earnings consequently cannot easily distinguish between the effect of UI and the highly
correlated influence of previous earnings.  Identification is impossible without a functional form
assumption on the relationship between previous earnings and spell length.
7
A key idea behind this study is illustrated by Figure 1.  Figure 1 displays the schedule
relating the UI weekly benefit amount (WBA) in New York to previous average weekly earnings. 
The schedule is typical of those in the other states.  The solid line is the schedule prior to the
April 17, 1989 increase in the maximum weekly benefit amount.  The dashed line is the  revision
to the schedule due to the benefit increase.  Between the minimum and the maximum, the weekly
benefit amount is one-half of previous weekly earnings.  The UI reform increased the benefits
3 received by the High Earnings group with previous weekly earnings greater than E , and
23 increased the benefits of the Medium Earnings group with earnings between E  and E .  But, the
12 Low Earnings group, with earnings between E  and E , was unaffected by the change.  These
Low Earnings individuals provide a natural comparison group to capture changes over time
common to all individuals in the state.  By comparing changes in spell lengths and the number of
claims before and after the benefit increase for these three groups, we estimate the effects of
higher benefits.  
The New York benefit increase was unexpected and applicable to all weeks claimed after
April 17, 1989 regardless of when an individual filed for benefits.  This unusual aspect of the
change allows us to examine the effect of benefits on those who had filed just prior to the
increase and for whom the increase was unexpected.  Thus, we can separate the effect of higher
benefits on duration from its effect on the composition of the pool of claimants who start spells. 
There is only a small literature on the effect of benefit generosity on UI take-up, but research
indicates that between one-quarter and one-half of the unemployed eligible for benefits have not       See Blank and Card (1991) and Vroman (1991).
8
4
filed in recent years.   Corson and Nicholson (1998) and Blank and Card (1991) estimate the
8
effect of the weekly benefit amount on UI take-up rate and find elasticities of 0.2 to 0.6 in
aggregate Current Population Survey state by year data.  Blank and Card find no significant
effect in Panel Study of Income Dynamics micro data.  McCall (1995) finds elasticities that range
from 0.26 to 0.35 in microdata.  Anderson and Meyer (1997) using administrative data from the
Comprehensive Wage and Benefit History project and find benefit amount elasticities ranging
from about 0.4 to nearly 1.0.  
Since the benefits of filing for UI depend on a person's expected duration of
unemployment, one might expect those who enter the UI pool when benefits rise to be different
from those who currently receive benefits.  It is unlikely that available explanatory variables
would be able to account for this tendency, as they explain only a tiny fraction of variation in
durations.  No previous study has been able to examine the effect of benefits on the duration of
UI claims without possible bias due to changes in the pool of claimants.  One might believe that
endogenous takeup would necessarily lead duration elasticities to be biased downward. 
However, as the model below clearly shows, this may not be the case.  Intuitively, those who do
not apply for benefits are likely those with shorter expected (and on average actual) durations. 
However, those among the pool of initial non-applicants who are most likely to be induced by a
benefit increase to apply are those who would receive the most from the increase, i.e. those who
expect to have a long duration and thus receive that higher benefit for many weeks.  Thus, the
bias in the duration elasticity could be upward.     
There are drawbacks to examining one state over a two-year period.  There may be
important macroeconomic changes during the period.  The techniques used in the paper remove
any bias if such changes affect the different earnings groups equally.  However, if changes in the
macroeconomy affecting unemployment are peculiar to the High and Medium Earnings groups,
then biases would result.  Most macroeconomic shocks are thought of as shocks to particular      A provision which applied to less than one percent of claims allowed eligibility for those who
9
worked 15 weeks over the last 52 weeks with a weekly wage of at least $80 and who worked at
least 40 weeks in the last 104 weeks with at least $3,200 in total earnings during those 40 weeks.
5
industries or regions.  Therefore, we look within industries and  regions in New York to see if
similar patterns emerge.   Fortunately, New York State is large enough for these sub-state
analyses.
2.  The New York State UI Law and the Data
This section describes the main characteristics of New York State's UI law and the data
used in the study.  To qualify for UI, an individual had to have worked at least 20 weeks out of
the preceding 52 and have earned an average of at least 80 dollars during those weeks worked.  
9
The weekly benefit paid after a one week waiting period was 50 percent of average weekly
earnings, so that the minimum weekly benefit was $40.  The maximum weekly benefit was
originally $180 and increased to $245 on April 17, 1989.  The maximum weekly benefit rose
again on April 16, 1990 to $260.  The potential duration of benefits was a uniform 26 weeks
during the period examined.
The individual claim data used in the study come from separate data files for 1988 and
1989 which include all UI recipients who began claims in those years.  The number of days of
benefits received is recorded, as well as age, sex, race, education, the 4-digit SIC of the previous
employer, the week the claim was filed, previous earnings and weeks worked, and the 5-digit zip
code of the claimant.  Close to one-half million claims are available for each year.
We asked the New York State Department of Labor to delete some classes of
observations from the tapes on which we perform most analyses.  Claims from firms with mass
layoffs during the year are dropped, as are claims from firms with extended strikes.  These
deletions were made because strikes might unduly influence the results and individual      See U.S. Department of Labor (1989, 1990) for tabulations of mass layoffs by industry and
10
time period.
      The changes in duration and incidence are very similar in the first two quarters if these
11
exclusions are not made.  For the last two quarters, the main change is that 32,000 striking
workers from NYNEX Corporation are deleted.
      The effects of UI on unemployment duration are well known, so we do not explicitly discuss
12
them here.  See Meyer (2002) for references. 
6
observations from mass layoffs or strikes cannot be taken as independent in either incidence or
duration calculations.  In New York, workers on strike are eligible for UI benefits after eight
weeks.  An examination of Current Wage Developments  reveals only three work stoppages
involving 1,000 or more workers in New York during the sample period.  Observations from
these firms are deleted including 32,000 NYNEX Corporation workers who were on strike from
August 6 to December 4 of 1989.  Observations from firms with mass layoffs according to the
BLS definition are also excluded.  The BLS defines a mass layoff to be a layoff of at least 31
days duration, involving 50 or more individuals who filed initial claims for UI during a
consecutive 3-week period.   The exclusion of mass layoff data is based partly on the value of
10
the dependent variable, so it likely induces a small amount of bias in duration estimates.   In all,
11
the strike and mass layoff exclusions reduce the 1988 sample from 476,173 to 454,169 and the
1989 sample from 581,881 to 519,846.
3.  A Model of UI Takeup and Biases in Duration Elasticities 
This section provides a theoretical model of the takeup decision and discusses some of its
implications.    In particular, we show how endogenous takeup can bias estimates of the benefit
12
effect on unemployment duration.  We suppose that a potential applicant maximizes expected
utility, which is taken to be a function of income and the stigma or transaction costs of applying
for UI.  The worker weighs these costs of applying against the benefits, which are determined7
primarily by the level and duration of benefits and the distribution of possible spell lengths that
the worker believes she faces.  This emphasis on expected spell length is motivated by the large
fraction of nonapplicants who indicate the they do not apply because they expect a short spell. 
Table 1 in Anderson and Meyer (1997) reports that 37 percent of those who believe that they are
eligible and do not apply indicate that they do not apply because they expect to get another job
soon or be recalled.  The next most common reasons (besides "other" and "don't know") are "too
much work/hassle to apply" at under 7 percent and "too much like charity/welfare" at under 6
percent.
Formally, let the utility of income y be U(y) for a non-applicant and U(y)-c for an
applicant.  For simplicity, the period is length one, the length of unemployment is 8, and the
potential duration of benefits is d.  The wage is w and the unemployment benefit is b.  Assume
that a potential applicant takes the cumulative distribution of unemployment spell lengths that
she could experience to be F(8).  Finally, assume that the application cost varies across
individuals so that c=C+,, where , is a continuously distributed random variable, with c.d.f. L. 
The expected utility of an individual who does not apply is
(3.1) 
while the expected utility of an applicant is
(3.2)   
An individual decides to apply if the benefits exceed the costs, i.e. if 
(3.3)   8
The implied probability of applying for UI is thus
(3.4)   
The effects of changes in the key individual and program characteristics can be
determined by differentiating this probability.  Higher UI benefits raise the takeup probability,
while lower application costs increase the probability of application.  A marginal increase in the
potential duration of benefits increases the probability, but only if the potential applicant believes
she may be unemployed at least as long as the potential duration.  An increase in the wage
decreases the application probability as long as U'' is negative.  One can also show that rightward
shifts in the distribution of expected unemployment spell lengths will increase the application
probability.
With a few simplifications, this framework can also be used to determine how a change in
the weekly benefit amount would affect the spell length composition of the pool of applicants. 
This derivative is important because it determines the bias in estimates of the elasticity of mean
spell duration with respect to the weekly benefit from samples of claimants.  Previous work has
often argued that endogenous takeup implies that duration elasticities are biased downward, since
non-claimants generally have shorter spells than claimants.  The following example shows that
marginal non-claimants may very well have longer spells than claimants so that the sign of the
bias is indeterminate.  
For simplicity, assume that utility is linear so that U''=0.  Also assume that there are two
12 equally common types of individuals with known spells lengths 8  and 8 , both less than d, and
that benefits have no effect on the duration of claims.  The mean spell length of applicants is now
(3.5)    where   and  .      Since our model can be applied to durations on other social insurance program where the
13
generosity of the program and expected duration affect participation, the result of indeterminate
bias also applies to programs such as AFDC and workers' compensation.
9
The mean duration of spells of claimants may increase or decrease with the level of UI benefits. 
12 Without loss of generality, assume 8  > 8 .  Then
 where   and  .
The intuition for this result should be pretty clear.  The outcome depends on the proportionate
change in the number of new claims among those with long spells relative to that for those with
ii i short spells.  8L' is the marginal change in new claims of type i, and dividing by L puts it in
proportionate terms.  More simply, the indeterminate sign occurs because an increase in the
weekly benefit amount has a greater effect on those who expect to be unemployed a long time
and thus expect to collect the higher weekly benefit for many weeks.  This tendency can offset
the fact that a larger share of those who expect long spells will have already claimed.  The
implication of this result is that endogenous takeup could bias unemployment duration estimates
in either direction.
13
The model above assumed that an individual makes a one-time decision at the start of
unemployment as to whether or not to file for UI.  Solon (1981), citing prior work by Ehrenberg,
Hamermesh and himself suggests a different argument.  In studies that use the duration of UI
claims, it may be that higher benefits induce a person to file more quickly, but do not effect the
time out of work.  Either this argument, or the one outlined above provide a reason that one may
want to obtain an estimate of duration effects of UI that is not potentially biased by an effect of
benefits on claim filing.10
4.  Economic Conditions in New York State
This section provides some background statistics on the New York State labor market
around the time of the benefit increase.  As this paper examines data from 1988 and 1989, it is
important to describe economic conditions at the time of the increase in UI benefits.  Table 1
reports monthly data on employment and unemployment for the 1988-1990 period.  Throughout
this period, the unemployment rate is quite low, averaging 4.2, 5.1, and 5.2 respectively in the
three years.  Employment rises by about 100,000 in each of 1988 and 1989 and then falls back to
its earlier level by the end of 1990.  During the period on which we primarily focus, the first two
quarters of 1988 and 1989, unemployment is almost 1 percentage point higher in the second year,
while employment is over 1 percent higher.  These patterns can be seen visually in Figure 2
which graphs the monthly employment level and the unemployment rate for 1988-1990.
Employment patterns by industry and region are a bit more complex.  Table 2 reports
employment by broad industry group.  None of the industries have pronounced secular increases
or decreases in employment.  Employment in Durable and Nondurable manufacturing does
decline somewhat, while the other industries tend to show increases.  The bottom several lines of
the table report measures of volatility or dispersion of industry level quarterly employment.  We
report the coefficient of variation of industry level employment measured in levels and
logarithms.  We also report the variance of the residuals of log employment after regressing it on
a constant and a time trend.  In these statistics construction sticks out as being much more
variable over time than any industry.  In fact, the variance of the detrended residuals for
construction is more than fifteen times that of the closest other industry.  This volatility of the
construction industry motivates our focus through much of the rest of the paper on a non-
construction sample.      The numbers reported are for the 10 largest areas within New York state which included
14
88.8 percent of employment in 1988.
      These tabulations exclude observations with no previous earnings, with weeks worked less
15
than 20 or real weekly earnings less than $80.  We also exclude the .3 percent of observations
with pension reductions in benefits to avoid the complications they would add.  These exclusions
eliminate 2.8 percent of observations in 1988 and 2.0 percent in 1989.  We also exclude those
who worked in the construction industry, which is a further 16.2 percent of observations in 1988
and 16.8 percent of observations in 1989.
11
Appendix Table 1 reports average monthly employment by sub-state region within New
York.   Due to changes in the benchmarks used in the data, the most valid comparisons can be
14
made between an April to October average for 1988 and 1989.  Over this period, employment
rises 1-2.5 percent in all regions except Nassau-Suffolk PMSA, Poughkeepsie and Binghampton
which have stable or declining employment. 
5.  Descriptive Statistics on Incidence and Duration
To assess the effects of the benefit increase, we begin by reporting incidence and duration
numbers by quarter and earnings group.  The statistics of most interest are the first quarter
duration statistics, and the second through fourth quarter incidence statistics.  The first quarter
duration numbers could not have been affected by changes in the pool of recipients, as UI
claimants did not know about the increase at the time they filed for benefits.  Increases in
duration for these claimants cannot be attributed to changes in the claimant pool, and may be
attributable to the benefit increase.  Almost all of the second, and all of the third and fourth
quarters of 1989 took place after the benefit increase, so these quarters should be examined for
changes in claim filing after the increase.
Table 3 reports the incidence and duration of UI claims by quarter for the 1988 and
1989.   We report separate estimates for the three earnings groups defined in Section 1 and
15
Figure 1.  The three groups are the High Earnings group, whose members experienced the full12 3       E , E  and E  in Figure 1 have been indexed using the annual change in average weekly
16
earnings of employees covered by the New York State UI law over 1987-1989, which was 5.3
12 3 percent and was supplied by the New York State Department of Labor.  Precisely, E , E  and E
are taken to be 80, 360, and 490/1.053 in 1988, respectively, and 80*1.053, 360*1.053, and 490
in 1989.  
12
effect of the benefit increase after April 17, 1989, the Medium Earnings group which received on
average less than half of the increase of the High Earnings group, and the Low Earnings group
whose benefits were unchanged by the UI reform.  The brackets for these earnings groups are
indexed using average weekly earnings in New York.   
16
For each quarter, we report the ratio of the number of claims in the two years and the
difference in the average number of weeks of benefits received in the two years.  At the bottom
of the upper panel, we also report the change in incidence for the High and Medium earnings
groups relative to the Low earnings group.  At the bottom of the lower panel, we report the
differences-in-differences for duration, comparing the changes for the High and Medium
earnings groups to those for the Low earnings group in each quarter.  
Several patterns are evident in the data.  First, there is a pronounced seasonality to both
the incidence and duration of claims.  Incidence is lowest in the second quarter for all earnings
groups and both years.  Duration is longest in the second and fourth quarters for all earnings
groups and both years.  The pronounced seasonality is the reason for comparing the different
calendar quarters of 1989 to the same quarter in the previous year.
There are only moderate changes in incidence for all of the earnings groups in the first
quarter (though the changes are significantly different from zero), but large changes in later
quarters.  In the first quarter, the High and Medium Earnings groups experience a 3-5 percent fall
in the number of claims, while Low Earnings incidence rises by 1 percent.  The roughly stable
pattern of incidence for the first quarter of 1989 relative to 1988 is another reason we focus on
this quarter in subsequent duration analyses.  There are large changes in incidence during the
other quarters, particularly quarters three and four.  In those quarters High Earnings claims rise
40 percent while Medium and Low claims rise about 20 and 15 percent, respectively.  These      The total weeks of benefits received in the benefit year may come from several spells.  Often
17
benefits are received over a longer calendar period than the number of weeks of UI receipt.
      The percentage increases in benefits for the High, Medium and Low groups are 12.6, 4.2 and
18
1.6 percent respectively in the first quarter.  They are approximately 29.1, 13.2 and 0 percent in
the other three quarters.
13
changes are highly statistically significant as the standard errors are always less than 1.5 percent
and often smaller.  These numbers are consistent with large effects of the higher benefits on the
relative incidence of claims. The implied incidence elasticities for the 3  quarter are 0.95 and
rd
0.86 for the High and Medium Earnings groups.  For the 4  quarter they are 0.73 and -0.09,
th
respectively.  There is a possibility that these numbers could be due to macroeconomic shocks to
industries or regions that are disproportionate employers of High and Medium Earnings workers. 
We show below that such shocks are not the explanation as the above patterns hold within sub-
state region and industry.
The durations numbers are also consistent with UI benefit effects.  There is a large
increase in mean duration of UI receipt in the first quarter for all earnings groups.  The changes
between 1988 and 1989 are larger for the High and Medium Earnings groups.  If one subtracts
off the change for Low Earnings individuals, the High and Medium changes are 0.66 and 0.11
weeks with standard errors of 0.10 and 0.12 respectively.  Thus the increase in benefits appears
to be associated with an increase in weeks of UI receipt.  One can scale these increases to arrive
at elasticities after making several assumptions.  High Earnings individuals in the first quarter are
affected more by the benefit increase if their spell began closer to when benefits rose.  We
calculate an average benefit for someone receiving 20 weeks of continuous benefits following the
claim week.  We use 20 weeks because the mean duration is about 16 weeks, but many
individuals' period of receipt is likely interrupted by periods when they do not receive UI.  
17
Using these assumptions, we calculate elasticities of mean duration with respect to the average
benefit of 0.41 for High Earnings individuals and 0.26 for Medium Earnings individuals.
18      We thank Julie Cullen for suggesting that we pursue this idea.  
19
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The second quarter has patterns similar to those of the first, while a very different view of
duration effects would be obtained from looking at the third and fourth quarters.  In these last
two quarters the duration of High Earnings claims falls relative to those of Low Earnings
individuals.  One should note though, that the increased relative incidence of High Earnings
claims may be associated with changes in composition of the pool of claimants.  The data from
the third and fourth quarter may provide a good example of the biases that can arise in duration
estimates when the effects of benefits on incidence are ignored.  This possibility of bias in
duration estimates when incidence is ignored was one of the key implications of the model of
Section 3.
Since the principal puzzle in Table 3 is the shorter durations in the third and fourth
quarters for High Earnings claims, we further investigated evidence for a change in the
composition of claims in these quarters.    For all four quarters and three earnings groups, we
19
predict durations in 1989 using a linear model estimated for that earnings group and quarter in
1988.  We predict durations using base year earnings, weeks worked in the base year, age,
gender, race, education, industry and region.  Table 4 reports the mean predicted duration from
these models along with the mean predicted duration for 1988 (which equals the actual mean
duration).  We focus on observable characteristics of claimants with the presumption that
observable and unobservable characteristics will move in the same direction (see Altonji, Elder
and Taber 2005 for a discussion of a stronger version of this assumption).  
We find that predicted durations change very little in the first quarter.  High earnings
predicted durations change less than 0.05 of a week between 1988 and 1989.  This result may be
expected since there was little change in the incidence of claims.  On the other hand, after the
benefit increase, in the third and fourth quarters when High Earnings claims increase sharply (but
durations fall) we see that the observable characteristics of claimants have shifted sharply in the
direction of those that tend to have shorter spells.  Mean predicted duration falls for the third15
quarter by three-quarters of a week, while fourth quarter predicted mean duration falls by more
than one-third of a week.  This result is consistent with endogenous takeup and the changed
composition of claims being responsible for the counterintuitive drop in spell length for High
Earnings claimants in the third and fourth quarters.   
We should also point out that the standard errors on changes in incidence and duration are
likely understated because observations that are part of large layoffs and recalls are not truly
independent.  There may also be shocks that we cannot account for which are common to all
High or Medium Earnings individuals during a quarter.
To assess if macroeconomic shocks to particular regions or industries could have caused
the changes in incidence and duration, we also examine the same statistics within regions and
industries.  For this analysis we group the 4 smallest regions together, to obtain 7 areas for which
we can obtain reasonably precise numbers.  In 6 of 7 regions, the High Earnings claims have
larger increases in duration than the Low Earnings claims in the first quarter.  In the third and
fourth quarters, all 7 regions experience larger increases in the incidence of claims for High
Earnings individuals than Low Earnings individuals, and 5 out of 7 do in the second quarter.
Within industry, the patterns of Table 3 are also fairly strong.  6 of the 7 largest industries
(in terms of first quarter UI claims) had larger  increases in first quarter duration for the High
Earnings group than the Low Earnings group.  The incidence changes in the later quarters were
even more widespread, with all 7 showing relative increases for the High Earnings group
compared to the Low Earnings group in the third and fourth quarters.  Thus, the changes in
incidence and duration by previous earnings group are widespread and not due to shocks to
particular industries or regions.
6.  Regression Estimates of Duration
The within region and industry analyses above suggest that changes in the composition of
the pool of UI claimants along these dimensions were not responsible for the increase in      We set durations of zero equal to 0.5 for this set of analyses.
20
      The regressions drop observations with missing age, sex, race, education, earnings or
21
industry.  They also drop out of state claims which by itself excludes 7.2 percent of the
observations.  Including the exclusions of Section 5, 20.8 percent of the 1988 observations and
12.7 percent of the 1989 observations are dropped (mostly due to missing education).
16
duration.  However, there are other characteristics of claimants that may have affected the
changes in duration such as age, education, race and previous earnings.  We want to control for
all of these characteristics at once.  This section reports regression equations for the duration of
UI claims which control for a large number of individual characteristics. We begin by estimating
equations that are the regression analog of differences-in-differences with controls.  The
specifications that we estimate are variants of the equation:
1 2  (6.1)   ln(duration) = " + $ After Increase*High Earnings + $ After Increase*Medium Earnings   
3 4  5                +  $ After Increase + $ High Earnings + $ Medium Earnings 
6 7  +  $ ln(previous weekly earnings) + $ ln(previous weeks worked) + (’ X + ,
where ln(duration) is the log of duration in days,  After Increase, High Earnings, and Medium
20
Earnings are indicator variables for being after the increase, in the high earnings group, and in the
medium earnings group, respectively.  The vector X includes age, sex, education, race, industry
and sub-state region.  Depending on the exact specification, X may also include indicator
variables for the week the spell began and additional interactions.
Table 5 reports the results from the regression estimates.  In all specifications, the sample
is the first quarter data.   Specifications (1) and (2) are the regression analogs of differences in
21
differences that are variants of equation (6.1).  Specification (2) replaces the After Increase, High
Earnings and Medium Earnings indicators with their interactions with a full set of indicator
variables for the week of the year a UI spell began (12 indicator variables).  The coefficients on
12 After Increase interacted with High Earnings ($ ) and Medium Earnings ($ ) are very similar to17
the estimates obtained by taking logs of the numbers in Table 3 and subtracting the Low Earnings
numbers from the Medium and High numbers.  This similarity suggests that changes in
observable individual characteristics in this sample are not very important (as was also found in
Section 5).  High Earnings durations rise about 8 percent, while Medium Earnings durations do
not appreciably change.  The coefficient on the High Earnings group after the increase is strongly
significant.
We also estimate specifications where the key explanatory variables are functions of the
weekly UI benefit amount.  We measure the benefit increase using a variable which is the
average benefit that a claimant would receive during a 20 continuous week claim beginning after
the filing week (see Section 5 for a discussion).  We can compare the coefficient on this variable
to that on a conventional benefit variable identified by the nonlinear relationship between
benefits and previous earnings.  These specifications are of the form:
      
1 2 (6.2)  ln(duration) = " + $ [ln(average new benefit) - ln (old benefit)] +  $  ln(old benefit)      
3 4  5  +  $ After Increase + $ High Earnings + $ Medium Earnings 
6 7  +  $ ln(previous weekly earnings) + $ ln(previous weeks worked) + (’ X + ,.
The first variable is the logarithm of the average weekly benefit a claimant would receive under
the new law during a 20 week claim minus the logarithm of the benefit under the old law.  This
variable captures the change in the weekly benefit amount with the new law.   The second
variable is the ln(old benefit) which is the logarithm of weekly benefits under the old UI law.  It
2 is separately identified from previous earnings through the kink in the benefit schedule at E  in
Figure 1.  As both variables are in logarithms, their coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. 
Specifications (3) through (6) in Table 5 are variants of this equation.   
12 The estimates of the two benefit coefficients ($  and  $ ) are fairly similar across the
different specifications and are similar to each other.  The coefficient on the old benefit is always18
0.26.  The coefficient on the change in the benefit amount varies from 0.23 to 0.42.   A test of the
12 restriction  $  = $  fails to reject in all of the specifications.  A few of the specifications are
particularly noteworthy.  Specification (4) replaces the After Increase indicator with a set of
indicator variables for each of the possible weeks a spell could have begun.  Specification (5)
allows interactions between the 19 region and 10 industry dummies and the dummy variable for
being after the increase.  Thus, this specification allows for shocks to industries and regions after
the increase that are common to all earnings groups.  The coefficient on the benefit increase
variable is very similar to that in the other specifications.  Specification (6) includes interactions
between being after the increase and in the High and Medium Earnings groups as well as
including the two benefit variables.  Through Specification (5), the change in benefit coefficient
is strongly significant, while in Specification (6) the coefficient falls somewhat and is no longer
significant, largely due to a doubling of the standard error.  It also appears that the change in
duration for the High Earnings group in 1989 is not fully captured by the average benefit variable
as the coefficient on After Increase*High Earnings is positive and significantly different from
zero.  
Because durations are limited to be between 0 and 26 weeks, we also estimated Tobit
models which account for both this left and right censoring.  These specifications are reported in
Table 6.  The Tobit coefficients tend to be quite a bit larger than the linear regression estimates.
This result is not that surprising given that the Tobit coefficients can be interpreted as the effect
on underlying unemployment duration rather than the potentially censored weeks of UI receipt. 
The benefit elasticities from the dummy variable coefficients are close to 0.5 while the ln(WBA)
specifications suggest higher elasticities.  The change in ln(WBA) coefficients imply elasticities
of between 0.6 and 0.7, while the benefit coefficients identified through the bend in the schedule
12 suggest elasticities of around 0.4.  A test of the restriction $  = $  fails to reject in most
specifications, though it does reject in the case of specification (4).  The final specification in19
Table 6 indicates that it is difficult to separate out the effect of the change in the weekly benefit
from indicators for the groups that received the benefit increase.    
7.  Hazard Model Estimates of Duration
Hazard models provide a sensible way to account for two key features of the data.  First,
durations are both left censored at zero and right censored at 26 weeks as discussed above. 
Second, the level of the weekly UI benefit amount varies over the course of a spell for those who
filed shortly before the April 1989 benefit increase (and are in the Medium or High Earnings
groups).  Hazard models easily incorporate these two features of the data.  We estimate a series
of specifications for the hazard of leaving UI as a function of measures of time, the UI benefit,
i and individual characteristics.  Formally, let T be the length of individual i's period of UI receipt. 
i Then the hazard for individual i at time t, 8(t), is defined by the equation, 
.
Before estimating parametric models, we plot the hazard rate of those in the High Earnings group
and that of the Low Earnings group for comparison using the weekly hazard derived from daily
data.  The top panel of Figure 3 shows this pattern for 1988, while the bottom panel displays the
1989 pattern.  In 1988 the High and Low Earnings groups have almost identical hazards.  In
1989, after the increase in benefits in the 16  week for those in the High Earnings group, there
th
appears to be a fall in the hazard of those in the High Earnings group relative to that for the Low
Earnings group.  This pattern accords with the expected decline in the departure rate from the UI
rolls after benefits have increased.  20
To account for individual characteristics and economic conditions, we parameterize the
i0 i 0 hazard using a proportional hazards form, i.e. 8(t)= 8 (t)exp[z(t)'$].   8 (t) is called the baseline
hazard and captures how exit rates change as a spell progresses.  The time varying explanatory
i variables z(t) include the weekly benefit amount, as well as indicators for the current calendar
week.  Thus, we can account for the changing benefit and potentially changing conditions in the
i labor market in a sensible way.  The vector z(t) also includes time constant variables such as age,
gender, education, industry, region, previous earnings and weeks worked.  
Given our parameterization and weekly data, spell continuation probabilities can be
written as
(7.1) ,
i if z(t) is constant between t and t+1.  Equation (7.1) can be rewritten as 
(7.2)   , where  .
A likelihood function can then be constructed from terms like (7.2) and one minus the probability
in (7.2) as in Meyer (1990).
The first set of hazard model estimates is reported in Table 7.  Appendix Table 2 provides
the means by period and earnings group for the covariates that are included in the models
(variable definitions are provided in the Data Appendix).  These specifications include a dummy
variable for the week in question being after the benefit increase (After 16  week of 1989)
th
interacted with the High Earnings or Medium Earnings group.  Controls for previous earnings,
previous weeks worked, age, gender, education, race, industry, region, as well as indicators for21
the calendar week and the current spell length are included.  All of these specifications control
for being in the High Earnings group after the benefit increase.  Benefit effects are identified
through the exact timing of when the benefit increase took place.  
Specifications (1) and (2) do not include the Medium Earnings group.  Specification (2)
and (4) through (6)  include indicator variables for the week the spell began.  Specifications (5)
and (6) include indicators for industry and region interacted with being in the year of the benefit
increase.
These specifications indicate that the hazard of ending a UI claim falls by about 6 percent
after the weekly benefit rises for the High Earnings group.  The coefficients do not differ much
across specification.  As expected, there is a smaller coefficient for the Medium Earnings group,
but the coefficient is only marginally significantly different from zero.  The inclusion of controls
for the week a spell began or the interaction of industry and region with the second year of data
has little effect on the coefficients.  While these specifications control for being in the High
Earnings group after the increase it is a concern that the coefficient on After*High Earnings is
significantly different from zero even when we are controlling for the exact timing of the benefit
increase.  These coefficients suggest that there is an independent effect of being in the
After*High Earnings group or that our After 16  week variable does not fully capture the
th
benefits change.  Specification (6) only includes the spells beginning in the first six weeks of the
year.   This sample does not seem to suffer from this problem as the coefficient on After*High
Earnings is now small and not significant.  This sample is also of interest for a second reason. 
This sample will disproportionately include those whose benefits change later in their spell and
will thus emphasize changes in benefits near the end of the benefit entitlement period.   Some
past work has emphasized that the effect of UI on the hazard should fall with duration (see
Arulampalam and Stewart 1995).  This effect is a general prediction of search models, but does
not necessarily hold in labor supply models of unemployment.  We find little support for this22
prediction here as the coefficient estimate is slightly higher in specification (6) than in the other
specifications, the opposite of what some models predict 
Our final set of duration estimates is reported in Table 8.  These specifications include
functions of the weekly benefit amount rather than indicator variables.   Precisely, these
specifications include the logarithm of the weekly benefit amount in the current week minus the
benefit under the old UI law as well as a variable for the weekly benefit under the old law.  The
first variable captures the effect of the change in the schedule due to the benefit increase, while
the second variable identifies the effect of benefits through the bend in the schedule.  The
specifications examined are those analogous to the specifications of Table 7.  In addition
specification (7) is added to analyze the identification of benefit effects through the bend in the
schedule.  
These specifications suggest that a ten percent increase in the benefit lowers the hazard of
ending a UI spell by about 3 percent.  The estimates are not appreciably affected by adding
controls for the week a spell began or interactions of industry and region with the year of the
increase.  Specifications (5) and (6) in this table also control for being in the High (and Medium)
Earnings groups after the benefit increase as in Table 7.   We are now identified through the
exact timing of when benefits increase and by the amount that they increase.  The coefficient on
1 the change in the weekly benefit ($ ) falls somewhat, but is still significantly different from zero. 
In specification (6) we again restrict the sample to the first half of the quarter with the coefficient
on After*High Earnings again much smaller and not significantly different from zero, while the
change in benefit coefficient is little altered.
In most of the specifications, the estimated effect of the benefit under the old UI law is
slightly smaller than the coefficient on the change in the weekly benefit, but still strongly
12 significant.  We now more often reject the restriction $  = $  ; the evidence indicates that benefit
effect identified by the schedule nonlinearity is now statistically different from that identified by
the benefit increase, in specifications (1), (2) and (7).  We should emphasize that this former23
coefficient cannot be identified if one includes a completely flexible set of controls for prior
earnings.  The last specification (7) makes this clear, as the inclusion of a spline in past earnings
drives the standard error on this coefficient sharply upward and the point estimate becomes
implausible. 
Simulating Duration Elasticities
We also convert the duration coefficient estimates into elasticities.  Following equation (7.2), we
can write the estimated survivor function for observation i as
(7.3)  for t$1, where
 
The average estimated survivor function then is  
(7.4)   where  
Predicted mean duration of UI receipt (compensated duration) and full duration are then
and   respectively.  To calculate full duration we need to assume a value for  for
J>25.  We use the average over 0 to 25.  To simulate the effect of raising the level of UI benefits
by ten percent we can just multiply  in (7.3) by  for J<26, where  is the estimated24
coefficient on ln(WBA in Current Week)-ln(WBA Under Old Law)  from Table 8.  We estimate
elasticities by dividing the change in estimated duration from this exercise by 0.1.  For the
specifications in Table 8, using the first quarter of 1988 sample, the resulting elasticities are
reported in the last two rows.  The compensated duration elasticities range from 0.09 to 0.17,
while the total duration elasticities range from 0.12 to 0.23.  Overall, the benefit elasticity
estimates are smaller than many that have been found in the literature, such as those in Moffit
(1985), Meyer (1989, 1990), Classen (1979) and Solon (1985).
Subsamples
While the elasticities that we find for the overall sample are not large, there may be
components of the population whose durations respond strongly to UI.  In Table 9 we report
coefficient estimates on the logarithm of the change in benefits for four subsamples of the data:
men, women, those under 40 years of age, and those 40 and older.   The specifications that we
estimate are just those reported in the first six columns of Table 8, but estimated on these
subsamples.  The estimates differ sharply across the subsamples.   The total duration elasticities
for males range from 0.07 to 0.22, while for females they are much larger, ranging from 0.36 to
0.47.  Labor supply elasticities are generally found to be larger for women, and this finding may
be just another example of this regularity.  The total duration elasticities for those under 40, are
close to zero, while those for individuals 40 and older are quite large, ranging from 0.30 to 0.46.  
Since younger workers are generally thought to be more likely to be liquidity constrained, this
finding does not support the notion that liquidity constraints drive the duration response to UI
(Chetty 2006), though other factors could be behind the difference between younger and older
workers.  25
8.  Discussion and Conclusions
This paper examines the effect of a 36 percent increase in the maximum UI benefit in
New York State.  The benefit increase in New York had the unusual feature that it applied to
only high and medium earnings claimants and to in-progress spells.  The results suggest that this
increase in UI benefits led to a large increase in the number of unemployment insurance claims. 
However, we cannot exclude the possibility that shocks which disproportionately affected high
wage workers resulted in the increases in claims among high earning workers that received the
higher benefits.  We are able to rule out that shocks to particular industries or regions were
responsible for this result.  
There is strong evidence of an effect of the benefit increase on the duration of claims. 
We examine differences in means, regression estimates, as well as hazard model estimates that
use the exact timing and amount of the benefit increase.  The estimated elasticity of claim
duration with respect to the benefit is around 0.3.  This elasticty is somewhat lower that found by
Classen (1979), Solon (1985) and Meyer (1989) who also examined data around changes in
benefit generosity.  The estimates are about in the middle of other previous estimates.  We should
also note that the identification of the weekly benefit effect through the bend in the benefit
schedule alone yields roughly similar, though somewhat lower estimates.  
We also demonstrate how endogenous UI takeup can bias estimates of the effect of the
level of benefits on the mean duration of UI receipt.  We show the theoretical ambiguity of the
bias and the conflicting forces that lead to this result.  One-year comparisons of mean duration
changes in the quarters where the benefit increase was known to potential claimants and takeup
could respond yields wrong signed elasticities, illustrating that the potential for bias is real. 
Comparisons of observable characteristics of claimants indicate that there was a change in the      The effect of a surprise increase in benefits on unemployment could be either bigger or
22
smaller than the effect of an expected change.  If workers expect a benefit increase, they might
change the type of job they take, or change the care they take to avoid being laid off (much of this
would appear in incidence but might affect duration through the types of composition changes
the paper emphasizes).  These types of changes would likely make the response to an expected
increase greater than that to a surprise increase.  On the other hand, if one considers savings
responses to UI, an increase in benefits that is expected will lead people to save less.  Thus, the
difference in unemployment durations between the high and low benefit regimes would be
reduced because assets would be lower in the high benefit regime, implying that high benefit
durations would be shorter than they would be if assets did not change.
26
composition of claims following the benefit increase that could explain this otherwise anomalous
result.   
The overall elasticities that we find tend to be low.  However, for some large subsamples,
in particular those 40 and older and women, we find substantial elasticities.  There are several
factors to consider when comparing the estimates in this paper to other estimates.  First, it may be
that the estimates are biased because of macroeconomic shocks that disproportionately affect
High Earnings claims.  We have used several identification strategies including those that rely on
the exact timing and amount of the benefit increase to reduce the likelihood of this possibility. 
Second, it may be that the effect of a given benefit increase is smaller when the level of after-tax
benefits is low relative to previous earnings.  Most previous work has examined UI in a period
when benefits were not taxable and thus after-tax replacement rates were high.  We are also
primarily examining changes in benefits for the group with the lowest replacement rates, the
High Earnings group.  Even after the increase in benefits, the average replacement rate for this
group is only 0.37, as reported in Appendix Table 2.  Third, we capture a slightly different partial
derivative than usual since the benefit increase was a surprise. Changes in savings and other
responses could have not taken place.  This short-run elasticity may be lower than the long-run
one.   Fourth, it may be that UI benefits have a different impact during periods of low
22
unemployment such as New York in the late 1980's.  Fifth, our first quarter duration estimates
will mostly capture the effects of UI towards the end of the eligibility period.  One might expect a
given UI benefit increase to have a smaller impact then as suggested in Mortensen (1977) and27
emphasized in Arulampalam and Stewart (1995).  We have tested for this hypothesis above
(specification (6) in Tables 7 and 8) by examining the sample of spells starting in weeks 1-6 of
the first quarter.  Since the coefficient estimates from these alternative specifications are very
similar to the full sample estimates, they do not support this hypothesis.28
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 SOURCE:    Employment and Earnings, various issues. Figure 3 
Empirical Hazard of 1988 First Quarter Claimants, 
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Note:  These graphs show the Kaplan-Meier hazards for the High and Low Earnings Groups.  Only first quarter 
data are included, and those who worked in the construction industry are deleted.  95% confidence bands are also 
displayed.  
High 1988 Low 1988
High 1989 Low 1989 TABLE  1 
  Monthly Employment, Unemployment, and Labor Force 
  New York, 1988–1990 (thousands) 
          __________ 
 
  Month  Employment  Unemployment  Labor Force   Unemployment 
                     Rate    _               
      1988      
 January  8105.4  427.5  8532.9  5.01 
 February  8064.9  372.1  8437.0  4.41 
 March  8075.5  362.6  8438.1  4.30 
 April  7954.9  282.9  8237.8  3.43 
 May    7943.2  341.0  8284.2  4.12 
 June  8280.1  289.8  8569.9  3.38 
 July  8362.8  365.1  8727.9  4.18 
 August  8391.8  367.8  8759.6  4.20 
 September  8158.6  354.0  8512.6  4.16 
 October  8202.4  360.0  8562.4  4.20 
 November  8210.8  372.3  8583.1  4.34 
 December  8217.3  396.9  8614.2  4.61 
    
      1989    
 January  8169.3  484.7  8654.0  5.60 
 February  8140.5  477.2  8617.7  5.54 
 March  8101.6  399.5  8501.1  4.70 
 April  8169.3  483.2  8652.5  5.58 
 May    8143.2  445.4  8588.6  5.19 
 June  8361.9  411.9  8773.8  4.69 
 July  8445.3  411.2  8856.5  4.64 
 August  8305.7  421.1  8726.8  4.83 
 September  8140.1  447.4  8587.5  5.21 
 October  8265.1  401.2  8666.3  4.63 
 November  8307.0  442.4  8749.4  5.06 
 December  8304.7  482.1  8786.8  5.49 
       
      1990    
 January  8262.9  478.2  8741.1  5.47 
 February  8205.6  474.1  8679.7  5.46 
 March  8141.0  458.5  8599.5  5.33 
 April  8170.4  410.9  8581.3  4.79 
 May    8194.5  440.8  8635.3  5.10 
 June  8394.8  413.4  8808.2  4.69 
 July  8415.4  458.9  8874.3  5.17 
 August  8311.4  419.6  8731.0  4.81 
 September  8198.1  473.4  8671.5  5.46 
 October  8160.9  462.2  8623.1  5.36 
 November  8116.8  451.7  8568.5  5.27 
 December  8098.8  465.9  8564.2  5.44 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
    
 SOURCE:    Employment and Earnings, various issues. TABLE 2 
  Quarterly Employment by Major Industry, its Ratio to the 1987 Average, and Measures of Variability 
New York State, 1987-1989 (thousands) 
   





Manufacturing Transport  Trade  FIRE  Services  Government  Non-Agriculture 
           
1987:1  286.4 672.7 546.3 284.3  1650.7 774.2  2158.0  1398.0  7770.6 
 
 
0.8709 1.0117  0.987 0.9812  0.975 0.9757 0.9752 0.9971 0.9788 
1987:2  329.2 662.9 553.7 289.8  1688.4 789.6  2214.3  1416.5  7944.5 
 
 
1.0011  0.997 1.0003 1.0004 0.9973 0.9951 1.0007 1.0102 1.0008 
1987:3  354.4 659.9 556.4 288.9  1698.3 807.4  2221.6  1367.2  7954.2 
 
 
1.0778 0.9925 1.0052 0.9971 1.0031 1.0175 1.0039 0.9751  1.002 
1987:4  345.4 664.0 557.7 295.9  1734.5 802.8  2257.6  1426.8  8084.7 
 
 
1.0502 0.9987 1.0075 1.0213 1.0245 1.0117 1.0202 1.0176 1.0184 
1988:1  300.7 657.6 542.4 290.2  1679.4 796.8  2214.3  1433.1  7914.5 
 
 
0.9145  0.989 0.9799 1.0016  0.992 1.0041 1.0006 1.0221  0.997 
1988:2  342 665.9 547.1 296.0  1711.3 797.9  2266.4  1450.5  8077.1 
 
 
1.04 1.0015 0.9883 1.0218 1.0108 1.0056 1.0242 1.0345 1.0175 
1988:3  360.8 666.7 549.2 297.8  1720 799.3  2281.8  1396.9  8072.4 
 
 
1.0972 1.0027 0.9921 1.0278  1.016 1.0073 1.0311 0.9963 1.0169 
1988:4  347.7 669.3 551.8 304.1  1758.2 795.2  2312.5  1445.5  8184.4 
 
 
1.0574 1.0066 0.9969 1.0498 1.0385 1.0021  1.045 1.0310  1.031 
1989:1  304.2  656  537.6  299.7 1699.8 788.30 2287.1 1450.1 8022.8 
 
 
0.9251 0.9867 0.9711 1.0344 1.0041 0.9934 1.0335 1.0342 1.0106 
1989:2  339.1 652.5 543.7 308.1  1726.1 794.3  2345.7  1465.5  8174.9 
 
 
1.0313 0.9813 0.9821 1.0634 1.0195 1.0009 1.0600 1.0452 1.0298 
1989:3  360 646.7 543.8 308.0  1725.5 794.0  2352.8  1404.6  8135.2 
 
 
1.0946 0.9726 0.9823  1.063 1.0192 1.0006 1.0632 1.0018 1.0248 
1989:4  342.9 639.1 536.9 318.5  1744.2 786.4  2375.6  1470  8213.5 
 
 
1.0428 0.9612 0.9699 1.0994 1.0302  0.991 1.0735 1.0484 1.0346 
Coefficient of Variation        
           
Levels  7.315 1.474 1.242  3.3 1.747 1.082 2.876 2.189 1.622 
Logs  1.302 0.228 0.197 0.575 0.236 0.163 0.373 0.303 0.181 
           
Variance of Detrended Log Employment Residuals  (*10
3)         
           
  4.856 0.099 0.089 0.113 0.162 0.118 0.071 0.314 0.082 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
SOURCE:  Unpublished tabulations supplied by the New York State Department of Labor.   
  TABLE 3 
Incidence and Duration of UI Claims by Quarter 
Year Before and Year of Benefit Increase 
                                                                                                
 
       First            Second   Third           Fourth 
      Quarter   Quarter  Quarter          Quarter 
                                                                                                 
Number of Claims (Incidence) 
  
High Earnings Group 
   1988  25384  18961  21926  19604 
   1989  23722  22718  30842  27456 
        
   1989/1988  0.9345  1.1981  1.4066  1.4005 
    (0.0084) (0.0118)  (0.0124) (0.0131) 
Medium Earnings Group 
   1988  16604  11980  12767  14833 
   1989  15802  13746  15862  17430 
 
   1989/1988  0.9517  1.1474  1.2424  1.1751 
    (0.0106) (0.0143)  (0.0148) (0.0131) 
Low Earnings Group 
   1988  63450  47374  52193  62727 
   1989  64066  57089  58981  74468 
 
   1989/1988  1.0097  1.2051  1.1301  1.1872 
    (0.0057) (0.0075)  (0.0068) (0.0064) 
 
   High - Low  -0.0752  -0.0069  0.2766  0.2134 
    (0.0102) (0.0140)  (0.0142) (0.0146) 
  
   Medium - Low  -0.0580  -0.0577  0.1124  -0.0121 
    (0.0120) (0.0162)  (0.0163) (0.0146) 
 
Average Duration of Claims (Weeks)  
 
High Earnings Group 
   1988  14.8305  16.3682  13.8926  16.1360 
   1989  16.1064  17.0709  13.6652  16.3244 
 
   1989-1988  1.2759  0.7027  -0.2275  0.1884 
    (0.0852) (0.0932)  (0.0884) (0.0891) 
Medium Earnings Group 
   1988  15.5545  16.7124  15.9172  16.3703 
   1989  16.2726  17.2976  16.3646  17.2426 
 
   1989-1988  0.7181  0.5852  0.4473  0.8723 
    (0.1058) (0.1187)  (0.1163) (0.1060) 
Low Earnings Group 
   1988  14.8878  15.6045  14.2683  16.0267 
   1989  15.5005  15.7965  15.0752  16.4805 
 
   1989-1988  0.6128  0.1920  0.8069  0.4538 
    (0.0535) (0.0586)  (0.0571) (0.0500) 
 
   High - Low   0.6631  0.5107  -1.0344  -0.2654 
    (0.1007) (0.1100)  (0.1052) (0.1022) 
 
   Medium - Low  0.1053  0.3932  -0.3596   0.4185 
    (0.1186) (0.1324)  (0.1295) (0.1172) 
                                                                                                
 
Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The standard errors for ratios of number of claims 
are calculated using the delta method applied to (sample size after)/(sample size after + sample 
size before) treated as a binomial.  The sample excludes those who worked in the construction 
industry prior to employment and includes some claimants who did not receive unemployment 
benefits.  
TABLE 4 
Actual and Predicted Duration in 1988 and 1989 using Linear 
Regression Equations Estimated on 1988 Data 
 
High Medium  Low 
      
1
st Quarter     
    1988 Actual and Predicted  14.7666 15.5758 14.8893 
     R
2   0.0917   0.0963   0.0914 
    1989 Predicted  14.8040 15.6821 14.9228 
    1989 Actual  15.9789 16.2136 15.4690 
    1989 Predicted -1988    0.0374   0.1063   0.0335 
   (0.0124)   (0.0147)   (0.0064) 
     
2
nd Quarter     
    1988 Actual and Predicted  16.2423 16.9157 15.6706 
     R
2   0.0692   0.0945   0.0803 
    1989 Predicted  16.0035 16.7744 15.5746 
    1989 Actual  16.8907 17.2887 15.7672 
    1989 Predicted-1988  -0.2388 -0.1413 -0.0960 
   (0.0204)   (0.0159)   (0.0073) 
     
3
rd Quarter     
    1988 Actual and Predicted  13.4507 15.8832 14.1761 
     R
2   0.2090   0.0972   0.1014 
    1989 Predicted  12.6883 15.6499 14.2015 
    1989 Actual  13.1597 16.3672 14.9582 
    1989 Predicted -1988  -0.7624 -0.2333   0.0254 
   (0.0167)   (0.0176)   (0.0069) 
     
4
th Quarter     
    1988 Actual and Predicted  15.9280 16.2567 15.9576 
     R
2   0.0862   0.1467   0.0982 
    1989 Predicted  15.5693 16.2958 15.7264 
    1989 Actual  15.9047 17.1116 16.4017 
    1989 Predicted-1988  -0.3587   0.0391 -0.2312 
   (0.0193)   (0.0165)   (0.0056) 
 
 
Notes:  (1) Separate regressions are estimated for each quarter and earnings group.  (2) Each 
regression has duration in days as the dependent variable. All equations include a constant, base 
year earnings, weeks worked in the base year, age, gender, race and education indicator 
variables, industry and region indicator variables.  (3) Those in construction, with missing 
demographics, no previous earnings, with weeks worked less than 20, real weekly earnings less 
than $80 ($84.24 in 1989), out of state observations and those with pension reductions are 
deleted.   
   TABLE 5 
  First Quarter Regression Equations for Natural Logarithm of Duration  
     
                                                  Specification 
                           _______________________________________________________   
Explanatory Variable
          (1)      (2)       (3)      (4)      (5)       (6) 
     
After Increase*  0.0729   0.0869        0.0478 
High Earnings Group  (0.0152)  (0.0153)        (0.0265) 
 
After  Increase*  -0.0025  0.0081      -0.0081 
Medium Earnings Group  (0.0173)  (0.0174)        (0.0191) 
 
(Ln(WBA Under New Law)      0.2752  0.4172  0.3591  0.2371 
-Ln(WBA Under Old Law))      (0.0896)  (0.0959)  (0.0976)  (0.1789) 
*After Benefit Increase       
 
Ln(WBA Under Old Law)      0.2610  0.2600  0.2615  0.2617 
      (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0247) 
 
Ln(Weekly  Earnings)  0.1977  0.1946 -0.0043 -0.0066 -0.0076 -0.0082 
  (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0220) 
Ln(Weeks  Worked)  -0.5534 -0.5541 -0.5640 -0.5641 -0.5646 -0.5649 
  (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) 
After Increase   -0.0032    -0.0032 
 (0.0076)    (0.0067) 
High Earnings Group  -0.2222    -0.1091  -0.1219  -0.1175 
  (0.0158)    (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0170) 
Medium Earnings Group  -0.0383    -0.0499  -0.0560  -0.0541 
  (0.0140)    (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) 
Week Spell Began* 
Before and After Increase    yes    yes  yes  yes 
 
Week Spell Began* 
High and Medium Earnings    yes        yes 
 
Age, Sex, Education, and 
Race  Indicator  Variables  yes yes yes  yes  yes yes 
 
Industry  Indicators  yes yes yes  yes  yes yes 
 
Region  Indicators  yes yes yes  yes  yes yes 
 
Industry and Region* 
After Interactions          yes       yes 
 
R
2  0.0518 0.0549 0.0523 0.0551 0.0559 0.0555 
   
Notes:  (1) Standard errors are in parentheses.  (2) The sample size is 173,927.  (3) All equations include a constant, and all 
earnings and benefit amounts are in 1988 dollars.  (3)  Durations of zero are recoded to 0.5.  (4) Only Q1 observations are 
included, those in construction, with missing demographics, no previous earnings, with weeks worked less than 20, real 
weekly earnings less than $80 ($84.24 in 1989), out of state observations and those with pension reductions are deleted.  
    TABLE 6 
  First Quarter Tobit Regression Equations for Natural Logarithm of Duration  
     
                                                  Specification 
                            ______________________________________________________   
Explanatory Variable
          (1)      (2)       (3)      (4)      (5)       (6) 
     
After  Increase*  0.1236  0.1479      0.0838 
High Earnings Group  (0.0223)  (0.0224)        (0.0390) 
 
After Increase*   0.0117  0.0295         0.0021 
Medium Earnings Group  (0.0255)  (0.0256)        (0.0281) 
 
(Ln(WBA Under New Law)      0.6253  0.7015  0.6085   0.3981 
-Ln(WBA Under Old Law))      (0.1328)  (0.1420)   (0.1445)  (0.2650) 
*After Benefit Increase       
 
Ln(WBA Under Old Law)      0.4007  0.3950  0.3964  0.3961 
      (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0367) 
 
Ln(Weekly  Earnings)  0.2985  0.2927 -0.0135 -0.0143 -0.0152    -0.0158 
  (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0326) 
  
Ln(Weeks  Worked)  -0.7626 -0.7657 -0.7798 -0.7814 -0.7822 -0.7829 
  (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) 
After Increase   -0.0249     0.0335 
 (0.0112)    (0.0098) 
High Earnings Group  -0.3447    -0.1764  -0.1886  -0.1826 
  (0.0232)    (0.0250) (0.0251) (0.0252) 
Medium Earnings Group  -0.0529    -0.0657  -0.0724  -0.0699 
  (0.0206)    (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) 
Week Spell Began* 
Before and After Increase    yes    yes  yes  yes 
 
Week Spell Began* 
High and Medium Earnings    yes        yes 
 
Age, Sex, Education, and 
Race  Indicator  Variables yes yes yes  yes yes  yes 
 
Industry  Indicators  yes yes yes  yes yes  yes 
 
Region  Indicators  yes yes yes  yes yes  yes 
 
Industry and Region* 
After  Interactions        yes  yes 
 
           _____ 
Notes:  (1) Standard errors are in parentheses.  (2) The sample size is 173,927.  (3) All equations include a constant, and all 
earnings and benefit amounts are in 1988 dollars.  (4) Only Q1 observations are included, those in construction, with missing 
demographics, no previous earnings, with weeks worked less than 20, real weekly earnings less than $80 ($84.24 in 1989), 
out of state observations and those with pension reductions are deleted.  The number of left censored observations is 6,810, 
while the number of right censored observations is 53,778.                                        TABLE 7 
  First Quarter Duration Model Estimates,  
Using Time-Period Interactions to Identify the Effect of the Benefit Increase 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                          Specification 
                           __________________________________________________________________________ __    
Explanatory Variable
      (1)          (2)           (3)          (4)          (5)          (6) 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
          
After 16















        
After 16












        












        
Medium Earnings 
Group 








        












        








        
Week Spell Began 
Indicators   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
Industry and Region* 
After Interactions       Yes  Yes 
        
Medium Earnings 
Group  Included in 
Sample 
    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Only Spells 
Beginning in  
Weeks 1-6 




            _______________  
Notes:  (1) Standard errors are in parentheses.  (2) Controls for previous earnings, previous weeks worked, age, gender, 
education, race, industry and region are included.  In addition, indicator variables for each calendar week are included. 
(3) Only Q1 observations are included, those in construction, with missing demographics, no previous earnings, with weeks 
worked less than 20, real weekly earnings less than $80 ($84.24 in 1989), out of state observations and those with pension 
reductions are deleted. Table 8 
  First Quarter Duration Model Estimates, 
Using Benefit Level Variables to Capture the Effect of the Benefit Increase 
         
                                             Specification 
                           _____________________________________________________________________________   
 
Explanatory Variable
   (1)      (2)       (3)      (4)      (5)      (6)      (7)             
       
 
          
Ln(WBA in Current Week)  















         














         














         










         
After*High Earnings       -0.0664 
(0.0163) 
-0.0229 
(0.0212)   
           
After*Medium Earnings       -0.0040 
(0.0170) 
 0.0447 
(0.0229)   
           
Week Spell Began 
Indicators    Yes       
          
Industry and Region* 
After Interactions        Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Ln(Earnings)Spline          Yes 
          
Medium Earnings Group  
Included in Sample      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Only Spells Beginning 
in Weeks 1-6         Yes   
          
Compensated Duration 
Elasticity  0.1629 0.1686 0.1443 0.1363 0.0897 0.0900 0.1478 
          
Total Duration 
Elasticity  0.2205 0.2283 0.1958 0.1849 0.1216 0.1212 0.2005 
   
Notes:  (1) Standard errors are in parentheses.  (2) Controls for previous earnings, previous weeks worked, age, gender, 
education, race, industry and region are included.  In addition, indicator variables for each calendar week, and the current 
spell length are included.  (3) Only Q1 observations are included, those in construction, with missing demographics, no 
previous earnings, with weeks worked less than 20, real weekly earnings less than $80 ($84.24 in 1989), out of state 
observations and those with pension reductions are deleted.  (4)  The compensated and total duration elasticities are 
computed based on a simulated 10% benefit increase. Table 9 
First Quarter Duration Model Estimates, Table 8 Specifications, 
Compensated and Total Duration Elasticities for Subsamples 
                 
                                             Specification 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Male 
        
Ln(WBA in Current Week)   













        
Compensated Elasticity   0.1594   0.1594   0.1243   0.1129   0.0535   0.1665 
Total Duration Elasticity   0.2128   0.2128   0.1665   0.1511   0.0715   0.2229 
 
Female 
        
Ln(WBA in Current Week)   













        
Compensated Elasticity   0.2631   0.2745   0.3068   0.3032   0.3453   0.3271 
Total Duration Elasticity   0.3600   0.3757   0.4216   0.4167   0.4748   0.4426 
 
Age Less than 40 
        
Ln(WBA in Current Week)   













        
Compensated Elasticity   0.0309   0.0362   0.0316   0.0194  -0.0103  -0.0093 
Total Duration Elasticity   0.0410   0.0481   0.0421   0.0259  -0.0137  -0.0124 
 
Age 40 and above 
        
Ln(WBA in Current Week)   













        
Compensated Elasticity   0.3166   0.3269   0.2864   0.2835   0.2463   0.2184 
Total Duration Elasticity   0.4457   0.4600   0.4040   0.3989   0.3461   0.3045 
 
Notes:  (1) Standard errors for the Ln(WBA in Current Week)-Ln(WBA Under Old Law) coefficients  are in parentheses.  (2) 
The specifications for these models are based on those in Table 8.  See Table 8 for details on specification.   (3)  The 
compensated and total duration elasticities are computed based on a simulated 10% benefit increase. 
 
 APPENDIX TABLE 1 
  Average Monthly Employment by Substate Region 
  New York State, 1988 and 1989 (thousands) 
                                                                                 
Sub-state Region                   April to October Average Monthly Employment 
   
                                     1988             1989          1989/1988 
                                                                            _         
New York PMSA  3913.0  3964.5  1.0132 
 
Nassau-Suffolk PMSA  1379.9  1380.4  1.0004 
 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy MSA  410.9  421.4  1.0254 
 
Poughkeepsie MSA  125.8  126.6  1.0062 
 
Orange County PMSA  129.5  132.9  1.0264 
 
Binghamton MSA  122.7  120.8  0.9849 
  
Buffalo PMSA  430.2  440.3  1.0235 
 
Rochester MSA  485.5  496.3  1.0223 
 
Syracuse MSA  302.4  310.1  1.0253 
 
Utica-Rome MSA  130.2  132.9  1.0208 
                                                                                   
SOURCE:  New York State Department of Labor (1991), Resident Employment Status 
of the Civilian Labor Force, 1974-1991. 
 APPENDIX TABLE 2 
  Means and Standard Deviations of Various Characteristics, 
First Quarter Observations in the Year Before and the Year of the Benefit Increase 
                                                                                 
  High Earnings Group  Medium Earnings Group  Low Earnings Group 
  Before After Before After Before After 
        
25-34  Years  of  Age  0.312 0.300 0.363 0.358 0.298 0.301 
35-44  Years  of  Age  0.280 0.283 0.233 0.241 0.196 0.204 
45-54  Years  of  Age  0.195 0.207 0.157 0.164 0.148 0.145 
55-64  Years  of  Age  0.148 0.147 0.115 0.116 0.120 0.117 
65 Years of Age  0.021  0.023  0.022  0.023  0.041  0.044 
Male  0.741 0.737 0.637 0.628 0.438 0.452 
Black  0.097 0.097 0.139 0.154 0.145 0.168 
Hispanic  0.054 0.055 0.109 0.113 0.159 0.145 
Other  Race  0.018 0.016 0.020 0.020 0.038 0.036 
9-11 Years of Education  0.106  0.095  0.140  0.129  0.201  0.197 
12 Years of Education  0.353  0.375  0.412  0.432  0.420  0.442 
13-15 Years of Education  0.204 0.188 0.208 0.194 0.160 0.145 
16 Years of Education  0.142  0.138  0.088  0.087  0.038  0.039 
17 Years of Education  0.144  0.153  0.054  0.070  0.021  0.031 
Previous Industry        
Agriculture  0.023 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.010 0.008 
Durable and Nondurable 
Manufacturing 
0.300 0.292 0.316 0.282 0.345 0.316 
Transport  0.071 0.074 0.067 0.069 0.046 0.047 
Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate 
0.129 0.101 0.105 0.095 0.050 0.047 
Services and Trade  0.447 0.486 0.468 0.511 0.520 0.552 
Government 0.019  0.017 0.024 0.023 0.025 0.027 
Communication 0.012  0.014 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.003 
Sub-state Region        
New York PMSA  0.201  0.203 0.172 0.180 0.151 0.149 
Nassau-Suffolk PMSA  0.403 0.404 0.418 0.422 0.355 0.362 
Albany, Schenectady and Troy 
MSA 
0.031 0.041 0.035 0.037 0.050 0.050 
Poughkeepsie, Orange 
County, Binghamton and 
Utica-Rome MSA 
0.050 0.054 0.060 0.073 0.082 0.085 
Buffalo  MSA  0.081 0.081 0.084 0.079 0.114 0.116 
Rochester  MSA  0.052 0.049 0.051 0.044 0.063 0.058 
Syracuse  MSA  0.048 0.035 0.053 0.045 0.050 0.046 
        
Initial  Replacement  Rate  0.284 0.269 0.444 0.422 0.500 0.499 
  (0.072) (0.068) (0.033) (0.031) (0.000) (0.003) 
Replacement  Rate   0.366  0.500  0.500 
After  Benefit  Increase   (0.093)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Real Weekly Earnings  696.470 695.365 407.263 407.038 228.199 229.183 
  (267.162)  (263.011)  (30.088) (30.054) (70.034) (70.699) 
Weeks Worked in Base Year  44.203 44.390 42.639 43.078 38.857 39.479 
  (9.241) (9.230) (9.929) (9.805) (10.676)  (10.705) 
        
N  17878 19173 12884 13615 52699 57678 
        
 
Notes:  (1) Standard deviations are in parentheses.  (2)  Only Q1 observations are included, those with missing demographics, 
no previous earnings, with weeks worked less than 20, real weekly earnings less than $80 ($84.24 in 1989), out of state 
observations and those in construction, with pension reductions are deleted.  (3)  Initial Replacement Rate is defined as the 
ratio of the benefit amount in the first week of claim to the person’s average weekly earnings. Data Appendix 
Explanatory Variables Used in Regressions 
                                                                                 
 
Previous Weeks Worked:  Number of weeks worked in the base year. 
 
Average Weekly Earnings:  Base year earnings divided by weeks worked in the base year.  Base year 
earnings are the earnings in the last 52 weeks prior to the week of filing. 
 
Week Spell Began:  13 indicator variables for the first 13 calendar weeks.  Equals one if the individual’s 
claim began in the particular week. 
 
Age:  Indicator variables for age 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65+. 
 
Race:  Indicator variables for black, Hispanic, and other non-white groups. 
 
Education:  Indicator variables for years of education 9-11, 12, 13-15, 16, and 17 or more. 
 
Gender:  Indicator variable for male. 
 
Industry:  Indicator variables for agriculture, durable manufacturing, nondurable manufacturing, 
transport, FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate), services, government, trade and communication.  
The reference industry is trade. 
 
Sub-state Region:  Indicator variables for New York City, Bronx, Suffern, Westchester, Long Island, 
Riverhead, AST (Albany, Schenectady and Troy), Kingston, Poughkeepsie, Monticel, Glenfall, Platts, 
Syracuse, Utica, Water, Binghamton, Buffalo, Rochester, James and Elmira.  The reference region is 
James. 
 
High Earnings Group:  Indicator variable for those whose real average weekly earnings (in 1988 dollars) 
are above $465.34. 
 
Medium Earnings Group:  Indicator variable for those whose real average weekly earnings (in 1988 
dollars) are between $360 and $465.34.  
 
Low Earnings Group:  Indicator variable for those whose real average weekly earnings (in 1988 dollars) 
were between $80 and $360.  
 
After Increase:  Indicator variable for those who filed a claim in 1989. 
 
WBA under Old Law:  Amount of weekly benefits under the law prior to the increase.  It is 50% of 
nominal average weekly earnings for those with nominal average weekly earnings between $80 and 
$360.  For those with average weekly earnings over $360, it is $180.  
 
WBA under New Law:  Average amount of weekly benefits under the law after the increase assuming a 
20 week spell beginning with the file date.  Weekly benefit amount from the date of increase is 50% of 
nominal average weekly earnings for those with nominal average weekly earnings between $80 and 
$490.  For those with average weekly earnings over $490, it is $245.  
  
Additional variables in duration models 
 
Calendar Week:  Indicator variables for each calendar week the person is at risk in the person-week 
format of the data (38 × 2 variables). 
 
Ln(Earnings) Spline:  The positive part of the difference between Ln(Real Average Weekly Earnings) 
and the logarithm of each decile of real average weekly earnings in the sample (9 variables in addition to 
Ln(Earnings)).   
 